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Abstract 
 
The decision to pay dividends is influenced by many financial factors. The purpose 
of this study is to find the relationships between corporate governance, institutional 
ownership, and the decision to pay dividends in American service firms. A sample of 296 
American firms listed on New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) for a period of 3 years (from 
2009-2011) was selected. This study applied a co-relational and non-experimental research 
design. The findings of this study indicate that the decision to pay dividends is a positive 
function of board size, CEO duality, and internationalization of the firm, and a negative 
function of institutional ownership. The results show that when i) firm size is held constant, 
the decision to pay an amount of dividends is a positive function of CEO duality, board 
size, and internationalization, and a negative function of institutional ownership, ii) firm 
performance is held constant, the decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO 
duality, and a negative function of institutional ownership, iii) financial leverage is held 
constant, the decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality, board size, 
and internationalization, and a negative function of institutional ownership, and iv) firm 
growth is held constant, the decision to pay dividends is a negative function of institutional 
ownership.This study contributes to the literature on the factors that influence the decision 
to pay an amount of dividends. The findings may be useful for stock market investors, 
stakeholders, financial managers, and financial management consultants. 
 
 
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Institutional Ownership, Dividend Payout,Firm Size, 
Firm Growth, Financial Leverage, Firm Performance. 
 
1.  Introduction 
The decision to pay dividends runs through many tough challenges before it is finalized. The board of 
directors and the CEO (the CEO is also Chairperson of the board in most companies) face many tough 
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challenges such as pressure from shareholders/investors, debt covenants (e.g., firms cannot pay 
dividends if debt payments have been skipped or defaulted), and financing needs of the firm. 
According to Michael (2011), because of the economic meltdown, investors have started to desire high 
current dividends to meet their socioeconomic needs. The bird-in-hand theory of Gordon (1963) 
supports this reality. 
Research on dividend payout started in 1956 with the seminal research work of Lintner (1956). 
Subsequently, Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Black (1976) developed theory on dividend payout. In 
their seminal work, Miller and Modigliani (1961) argued that given perfect capital markets, the 
dividend decision does not affect the firm value and is, therefore, irrelevant. However, most financial 
practitioners and many academics greeted this conclusion with surprise because the conventional 
wisdom at the time suggested that a properly managed dividend policy had an impact on share prices 
and shareholders’ wealth. 
Successful firms make profit which is distributed among stakeholders and used for future 
growth and prosperity. The board of directors and the CEO are required to make sound decisions 
related to earned income accumulated in retained earnings. The board of directors and the CEO have 
options to invest earned income in operating assets, to acquire securities, to retire debt, and/or 
distribute to shareholders in the form of cash dividends. However, issues arise when the board of 
directors and the CEO decide to distribute earned income among shareholders in the form dividends; 
that is, whether the distribution should be in the form of cash dividends, or passed on to shareholders 
by buying back some shares, and how stable the distribution should be. According to Brook et al. 
(1998) there is no reason to believe that corporate dividend policy is driven by a single goal. Black 
(1976) also argued that “the harder we look at the dividends picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, 
with pieces that just do not fit together.” 
Institutional ownership also plays an important role in the decision to pay dividends. The 
ownership and control structure of the firm affects its dividend payout strategies. Where institutional 
ownership (i.e., high percentage shareholding by institutions such as mutual fund companies, pension 
funds, or endowments) is high, these stakeholders try to control the agency problem by controlling the 
dividend payout decision. Maury and Pajuste (2002, p. 16) explain that the basic motivation for the 
agency models of dividends is that unless a firm’s profits are paid out as dividends, corporate managers 
may divert the cash flow for personal use or pursue unprofitable investment projects. Dividend payout 
can be seen as a means to reduce the free cash flow that managers can use at their own discretion 
(Jensen, 1986). As a consequence, outside shareholders may have a preference for dividends over 
retained earnings. 
Although research on dividend payout started in 1956, and different authors have written on 
dividend payout policy, the controversy about why firms should pay dividends has not been 
satisfactorily resolved (Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2008). The decision to pay dividends, in the 
context of this study, is defined as a pattern of cash distribution to shareholders over time. 
Literature shows a variety of variables that may affect the decision to pay a dividend. The 
selection of explanatory variables in this study is based on previous empirical studies related to 
dividend payout. The choice is sometimes limited, however, due to lack of relevant data. As a result, 
the final set of proxy variables includes ten factors: CEO Duality, Board Size, Institutional Ownership, 
Internationalization of Firm, Firm Size, Firm Performance (measured by return on assets), Financial 
Leverage, Firm Growth, Industry Dummy, and the decision to pay the amount of dividends. 
This study contributes to the literature on the factors that influence the decision to pay 
dividends in at least two ways. First, it focuses on American firms while only limited research has been 
conducted on such firms recently. Second this study validates some of the findings of previous authors 
by testing the relationship between CEO Duality, Board Size, Institutional Ownership, 
Internationalization of Firm, Firm Size, Firm Performance, Financial Leverage, Firm Growth, Industry 
Dummy, and the decision to pay dividends of the sample firms. Thus, this study adds substance to 
existing theory developed by previous authors. The results may be generalized to manufacturing and 
service industries. 
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2.  Literature Review 
There are many reasons why companies should pay dividends or not. Gill, Biger, and Tibrewala (2010, 
p. 8) describe that dividend payout is important for investors because i) dividends provide certainty 
about the company’s financial well-being, ii) dividends are attractive for investors looking to secure 
current income, and iii) dividends help maintain market price of the shares. Companies that have a 
long-standing history of stable dividend payouts would be negatively affected by lowering or omitting 
dividend distributions. These companies would be positively affected by increasing dividend payouts 
or making additional payouts of the same amounts because this sends a positive signal to the stock 
market. Furthermore, companies without a dividend history are generally viewed favorably when they 
declare new dividends. Thus, the board of directors and the CEO have to make tough decisions 
whether to pay dividends or not. If they pay dividends, the question becomes how much to pay per 
share? 
Previous authors identified a number of factors that influence the dividend payout decision of 
the firm including profitability, risk, cash flow, agency cost, growth, corporate governance, and 
institutional ownership (Higgins, 1981; Rozeff, 1982; Lloyd et al., 1985; Pruitt and Gitman, 1991; 
Jensen et al., 1992; Alli et al., 1993; Collins et al., 1996; D'Souza, 1999; Maury and Pajuste, 2002; 
Amidu and Abor, 2006; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2008; Gill, Biger, and Tibrewala, 2010); 
Subramaniam and Susela, 2011).Linter (1956) and Baker et al. (1985) explain that the dividend 
payment pattern of a firm is influenced by the current year’s earnings and previous year’s dividends. 
Empirical studies on the relationship between corporate governance, institutional ownership, 
and the dividend payout decision are discussed as follows: 
Baker et al. (1985) collected data from the U.S.A. and found that the anticipated level of future 
earnings is the determinant of dividend payment. 
Pruitt and Gitman (1991) surveyed 114 financial managers from American firms and found that 
current and past years' profits are important factors in influencing dividend payments. 
Collins et al. (1996) used Value Line Investment Survey from the U.S.A. and found a negative 
relationship between i) historical sales growth and dividend payout, and ii) firm’s risk and the dividend 
payout. 
Baker and Powell (2000) collected data from the NYSE (New York Stock Exchange) listed 
firms and found that dividend determinants are industry specific. 
Maury and Pajuste (2002, p. 15) collected data from the Helsinki Stock Exchange, Finland and 
found that the separation of ownership and control through high-voting shares and pyramid control 
structures does not have a significant impact on dividend policy. The authors concluded that i) the 
firm’s control structure affects the dividend payout policy and ii) dominant shareholders in control may 
collude in generating private benefits of control that are not shared with minority shareholders. Thus, 
high institutional ownership (i.e., high percentage shareholding by institutions such as mutual fund 
companies, pension funds, and/ or endowments) has a negative impact on the dividend payout 
decision. 
Amidu and Abor (2006) derived data from the financial statements of firms listed on the Ghana 
Stock Exchange during a six-year period and found a positive relationship between corporate 
profitability and dividend payout ratios, and a negative relationship between historical sales growth and 
dividend payout. 
Anil and Kapoor (2008) collected data from the Indian information technology sector and 
found that profitability has been considered a primary indicator of the dividend payout ratio. 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2008) sampled 985 UK firms and found that profitability is a 
crucial determinant of payout decisions, but the presence of strong block holders or block holder 
coalitions weakens the relationship between corporate earnings and the payout dynamics. Block 
holders appear to realize that an overly generous payout may render the company liquidity constrained, 
and consequently, result in a suboptimal investment policy. This lends some support to the “pecking 
order” of Myers (1984). 
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Ali-Shah (2009) collected data from Pakistani firms and found positive relationships between i) 
institutional ownership and dividend payout and ii) CEO duality and dividend payout. 
Gill, Biger, and Tibrewala (2010) sampled 266 American firms and found that dividend payout 
is a function of profit margin, sales growth, and debt-to-equity ratio. 
John and Muthusamy (2010) collected data from the Indian paper industry firms and found a 
negative relationship between i) firm growth and dividend payout, and ii) leverage and dividend 
payout. 
Wen and Jia (2010) sampled 137 American firms for the period 1993 to 2008 and found a 
negative relationship between institutional ownership and dividend payout. 
Bokpin (2011) collected data from Ghana and found a positive relationship between board size 
and dividend payout, and a negative relationship between financial leverage and dividend payout. 
Subramaniam and Susela (2011) sampled Malaysian firms for the period 2004 to 2006 and 
found that dividend payout is weaker for firms with a larger board size. 
Asif, Rasool, and Kamal (2011) used a sample of 403 companies listed on Karachi Stock 
Exchange for the period 2002 to 2008 and found a negative relationship between financial leverage and 
divided payout. 
Chen, Lin, and Yong-Cheol (2011) used 1056 A-share listed companies in Shanghai and 
Shenzhen stock market from 2001 to 2007 and found a positive relationship between the size of the 
board of directors and the propensity of companies to pay cash dividends, and a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and the propensity to pay cash dividends. 
In summary, the literature review shows that the decision to pay dividends is influenced by 
corporate governance, CEO duality, institutional ownership, firm size, firm growth, firm performance, 
financial leverage, and the industry in which firms operate. 
 
 
3.  Methods 
The co-relational and non-experimental research design was used to conduct this study. 
 
3.1. Measurement 
To remain consistent with previous studies, measures pertaining to: 
(i) CEO Duality, Board Size, and Institutional Ownership were taken from Kyereboah-Coleman 
(2007), 
(ii) Sales Growth was taken from Gill, Biger, and Tibrewala (2010), 
(iii) Financial Leverage, Firm Size, and Return on Assets were taken from Gill and Mathur (2011), 
and 
(iv) The decision to pay dividends was taken from Subramaniam and Susela (2011). 
Table 1 shows the measurements of the dependent, independent, and control variables. 
 
Table 1: Proxy Variables and their Measurements 
 
Regression Equation: DP =・+ ・1CDit+ ・2BSit+ ・3IOit+ ・4MULTIit+ ・5Indit + μit 
Variables Measurement 
The decision to pay the amount of dividends(DPi,t) Average dividend per share (2009-2011) 
Independent Variables Measurement 
CEO Duality (CDi,t) 
Assigned value one (1) if same person occupied the post of the 
chairperson and the CEO and zero (0) for otherwise 
Board Size (BSi,t) Measured as total number of directors serving on board 
Institutional Ownership (IOi,t) Percentage of shares held by institutions (e.g., pension funds) 
Control Variables Measurement 
Firm Size (FSi,t) Measured as log of total assets 
Return on Assets (ROAi,t) Net income / Total assets 
Financial Leverage (FLi,t) Total liabilities / Total assets 
Firm growth (FGi,t) (Current sales - Previous sales) / Previous sales 
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Table 1: Proxy Variables and their Measurements - continued 
 
Dummy Variables Measurement 
Internationalization of Firm (MULTIi,t) 
Firm was assigned value one (1) if it was a multinational 
corporation and zero (0) otherwise 
Industry Dummy (Control Variable - Indi,t) 
Assigned value one (1) for manufacturing industry and zero (0) for 
service industry 
μi,t= the error term 
 
3.2. Data Collection 
A database was built from a selection of approximately 700 financial-reports that were made public by 
publicly traded companies between January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011. The selection was drawn 
from Mergent Online [http://www.mergentonline.com/compsearch.asp] to draw a random sample of 
American firms. Out of approximately 700 financial-reports announced by public companies between 
January 1, 2009 and December 31, 2011, only 296 financial reports were usable. Cross sectional yearly 
data were used in this study. Thus, 296 financial reports resulted in 888 total observations. Since a 
random sampling method was used to select companies, the sample is considered a representative 
sample. Some of the firms were not included in the data due to lack of information for the time periods 
under study. 
 
3.3. Descriptive Statistics 
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of the dependent, independent, and control variables. The 
explanation of the descriptive statistics is as follows: 
(i) Manufacturing Firms: 156; Service firms: 140 
(ii) DP = $0.62 
(iii) BS: 10.28 
(iv) IO: 72% 
(v) FS = 3.48 million 
(vi) ROA: 8% 
(vii) FL:59% 
(viii) FG: 13% 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics (2009-2011) 
 
 Minimum Maximum Mean Standard Deviation 
DP 0.00 10.91 0.62 0.93 
BS 3 18 10.28 2.38 
IO 0.00 0.99 0.72 0.23 
FS 2.02 5.87 3.48 0.63 
ROA -0.02 0.35 0.08 0.05 
FL 0.08 3.87 0.59 0.33 
FG -0.81 2.45 0.13 0.22 
DP = The decision to pay the amount of dividends 
BS = Board size 
IO = Institutional ownership 
FS = Firm size 
ROA = Return on assets 
FL = Financial leverage 
FG = Firm growth 
 
3.4. Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
Overall, DP is positively correlated with CD and BS, and negatively correlated with IO. In the 
manufacturing industry, DP is positively correlated with CD, BS, and MULTI, and negatively 
International Research Journal of Finance and Economics - Issue 97 (2012) 65 
correlated with IO. In the service industry, DP is positively correlated with CD and BS, and negatively 
correlated with IO (see Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Pearson Bivariate Correlation Analysis 
 
Entire Sample (N = 296) 
 DP CD BS IO MULTI Ind 
DP 1 0.214** 0.254** -0.256** 0.048 0.022 
CD  1 0.017 -0.004 0.092 0.126* 
BS   1 -0.147* 0.024 -0.080 
IO    1 0.018 0.083 
MULTI     1 0.268** 
Ind      1 
Manufacturing Industry Sample (N = 156) 
 DP CD BS IO MULTI  
DP 1 0.185* 0.288** -0.166* 0.186*  
CD  1 0.064 -0.029 0.053  
BS   1 -0.064 0.082  
IO    1 0.080  
MULTI     1  
Service Industry Sample (N = 140) 
 DP CD BS IO MULTI  
DP 1 0.241** 0.247** -0.308** -0.016  
CD  1 -0.010 -0.003 0.069  
BS   1 -0.203* 0.026  
IO    1 -0.049  
MULTI     1  
**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
DP = The decision to pay the amount of dividends 
CD = CEO duality 
BS = Board size 
IO = Institutional ownership 
MULTI = Internationalization of firm 
Ind = Industry 
 
 
4.  Regression Analysis, Findings, Discussion, Conclusion, Limitations, and Future 
Research 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) multiple regression analysis was used to conduct data analysis. 
 
4.1. Regression Analysis and Findings 
Overall, positive relationships between i) CD and DP, and ii) BS and DP were found (see Table 4); that 
is, the decision to pay the amount of dividends is a positive function of CD and BS in American firms. 
A negative relationship between IO and DP was found; that is, the decision to pay the amount of 
dividends is a negative function of IO in American firms. Non-significant relationships between i) 
MULTI and DP and ii) Ind and DP were found; that is, MULTI and IND have no impact on the 
decision to pay the amount of dividends in the American firms. 
In the manufacturing industry, positive relationships between i) CD and DP, ii) BS and DP, and 
iii) MULTI and DP were found (see Table 4); that is, the decision to pay the amount of dividends is a 
positive function of CD, BS, and MULTI in American manufacturing firms. A negative relationship 
between IO and DP was found; that is, the decision to pay the amount of dividends is a negative 
function of IO in American manufacturing firms. 
In the service industry, positive relationships between i) CD and DP and ii) BS and DP were 
found (see Table 4); that is, the decision to pay the amount of dividends is a positive function of CD 
and BS in American service firms. A negative relationship between IO and DP was found; that is, the 
decision to pay the amount of dividends is a negative function of IO in American service firms. 
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Table 4: OLS Regression Estimates on Factors Affecting the Decision to Pay the Amount of Dividends a, b, c 
 
Entire Sample (N = 286) 
[R2 = 0.159; Adjusted R2 = 0.144; SEE = 0.860; F = 10.93; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000] 
Regression Equation: DP = 0.140 + 0.378 CD + 0.086 BS - 0.922 IO + 0.049 MULTI + 0.050 Ind 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
c t Sig. Collinearity Statistics B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 0.140 0.313  0.447 0.655   
CD 0.378 0.101 0.204 3.743 0.000 0.980 1.021 
BS 0.086 0.021 0.219 4.015 0.000 0.971 1.030 
IO -0.922 0.223 -0.225 -4.124 0.000 0.973 1.028 
MULTI 0.049 0.133 0.021 0.369 0.712 0.923 1.084 
Ind 0.050 0.105 0.027 0.478 0.633 0.906 1.104 
Manufacturing Industry Sample (N = 156) 
[R2 = 0.160; Adjusted R2 = 0.137; SEE = 0.642; F = 7.17; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000] 
Regression Equation: DP = -0213 + 0.217 CD + 0.077 BS -0.564IO +0.408 MULTI 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
c t Sig. Collinearity Statistics B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) -0.213 0.342  -0.624 0.533   
CD 0.217 0.105 0.155 2.076 0.040 0.993 1.007 
BS 0.077 0.023 0.253 3.372 0.001 0.985 1.015 
IO -0.564 0.266 -0.159 -2.121 0.036 0.988 1.013 
MULTI 0.408 0.181 0.169 2.252 0.026 0.983 1.017 
Service Industry Sample (N = 140) 
[R2 = 0.192; Adjusted R2 = 0.168; SEE = 1.04; F = 8.00; ANOVA’s Test Sig. = 0.000] 
Regression Equation: DP = 0.322 + 0.561 CD + 0.091 BS - 1.195 IO - 0.128 MULTI 
 Unstandardized Coefficients Standardized Coefficients 
c t Sig. Collinearity Statistics B Std. Error Beta Tolerance VIF 
(Constant) 0.322 0.527  .610 0.543   
CD 0.561 0.177 0.246 3.170 0.002 0.995 1.005 
BS 0.091 0.037 0.196 2.478 0.014 0.958 1.043 
IO -1.195 0.350 -0.270 -3.411 0.001 0.957 1.045 
MULTI -0.128 0.193 -0.052 -0.664 0.508 0.993 1.007 
a Dependent Variable: DP 
bIndependent Variables: CD, BS, IO, MULTI, and Ind 
cLinear Regression through the Origin 
SEE = Standard Error of the Estimate 
DP = The decision to pay the amount of dividends 
CD = CEO duality 
BS = Board size 
IO = Institutional ownership 
FS = Firm size 
ROA = Return on assets 
FL = Financial leverage 
FG = Firm growth 
MULTI = Internationalization of firm 
Ind = Industry 
 
Note that: 
 A test for multicollinearity was performed. All variance inflation factor (VIF) coefficients 
are less than 2 and tolerance coefficients are greater than 0.50 which is an excellent range. 
 Overall, Ind, BS, CD, IO, and MULTI explain 15.9% of the variance in DP. 
 In the manufacturing industry, MULTI, CD, IO, and BS explain 16% of the variance in 
DP. 
 In the service industry, MULTI, BS, CD, and IO explain 19.2% of the variance in DP. 
 
4.2. Test of Control Variable (Firm Size, FS) 
Based on Multiple Regression Analysis, it is concluded that when firm size is held constant: 
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(i) DP is a positive function of CD (Beta FS*CD = 0.199, Sig. = 0.001), and BS (Beta FS*BS = 
0.283, Sig. = 0.000), and a negative function of IO (Beta FS*IO = -0.103, Sig = 0.060) in 
America. 
(ii) DP is a positive function of CD (Beta FS*CD = 0.156, Sig. = 0.040), BS (Beta FS*BS = 0.206, 
Sig. = 0.027), and MULTI (Beta FS*MULTI = 0.194, Sig. 0.031)in American manufacturing 
industry. 
(iii) DP is a positive function of CD (Beta FS*CD = 0.229, Sig. = 0.006), and BS (Beta FS*BS = 
0.261, Sig. = 0.002), and a negative function of IO (Beta FS*IO = -0.163, Sig. = 0.040) in 
American service industry. 
In terms of variance explained when firm size is held constant: 
(i) Ind, FS*BS, FS*IO, FS*CD, and FS*MULTI explain 15.1% of the variance in DP of American 
firms. 
(ii) FS*MULTI, FS*IO, FS*CD, and FS*BS explain 20.9% of the variance in DP of American 
manufacturing firms. 
(iii) FS*MULTI, FS*IO, FS*CD, and FS*BS 16.9% of the variance in DP of American service 
firms. 
 
4.3. Test of Control Variable (Firm Performance, ROA) 
Based on multiple regression analysis, it is concluded that when firm performance is held constant: 
(i) DP is a positive function of CD (Beta ROA*CD = 0.167, Sig. 0.009) and a negative function of 
IO (Beta ROA*IO = -0.225, Sig. = 0.002)in America. 
(ii) DP is a negative function of IO (Beta ROA*IO = -0.252, Sig. = 0.028) in American 
manufacturing industry. 
(iii) DP is a positive function of CD (Beta ROA*CD = 0.169, Sig. 0.064) and a negative function of 
IO (Beta ROA*IO = -0.216, Sig. = 0.036) in American service industry. 
In terms of variance explained when firm performance is held constant: 
(i) Ind, ROA*BS, ROA*CD, ROA*IO, and ROA*MULTI explain 5.9% of the variance in 
DP of American firms. 
(ii) ROA*MULTI, ROA*CD, ROA*BS, and ROA*IO explain 6.9% of the variance in DP of 
American manufacturing firms. 
(iii) ROA*MULTI, ROA*CD, ROA*IO, and ROA*BS 6.2% of the variance in DP of 
American service firms. 
 
4.4. Test of Control Variable (Financial Leverage, FL) 
Based on Multiple Regression Analysis, it is concluded that when financial leverage is held constant: 
(i) DP is a positive function of CD (Beta FL*CD = 0.218, Sig. = 0.000), and BS (Beta FL*BS = 
0.294, Sig. = 0.000), and a negative function of IO (Beta FL*IO = -0.307, Sig. = 0.000) in 
America. 
(ii) DP is a positive function of CD (Beta FL*CD = 0.246, Sig. = 0.001), and MULTI (Beta 
FL*MULTI = 0.302, Sig. = 0.016), and a negative function of IO (Beta FL*IO = 0.302, Sig. 
0.036) in American manufacturing industry. 
(iii) DP is a positive function of CD (Beta FL*CD = 0.186, Sig. = 0.027), and BS (Beta FL*BS = 
0.279, Sig. = 0.020), and ii) a negative function of IO (Beta FL*IO = -0.332, Sig. = 0.004) in 
American service industry. 
In terms of variance explained when financial leverage is held constant: 
(i) Ind, FL*MULTI, FL*CD, FL*IO, and FL*BS explain 12.2% of the variance in DP of 
American firms. 
(ii) FL*MULTI, FL*CD, FL*IO, and FL*BS explain 21.9% of the variance in DP of 
American manufacturing firms. 
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(iii) FL*MULTI, FL*CD, FL*IO, and FL*BS 11.3% of the variance in DP of American 
service firms. 
 
4.5. Test of Control Variable (Firm Growth, FG) 
Based on Multiple Regression Analysis, it is concluded that when firm growth is held constant: 
(i) DP is a negative function of IO (Beta FG*IO = -0.263, Sig. = 0.049) in America (entire 
sample). 
(ii) DP is a negative function of IO (Beta FG*IO = -0.294, Sig. = 0.082) in American 
manufacturing industry. 
In terms of variance explained when firm growth is held constant: 
(i) Ind, FG*BS, FG*CD, FG*MULTI, and FG*IO explain 2.8% of the variance in DP of 
American firms (entire sample). 
(ii) FG*MULTI, FG*IO, FG*CD, and FG*BS explain 2.4% of the variance in DP of 
American manufacturing firms. 
 
4.6. Discussion and Conclusion 
The purpose of this study was to find the impact of corporate governance and institutional ownership 
on the decision to pay dividends. Overall, findings show that the decision to pay dividends is a positive 
function of CEO duality and board size, and a negative function of institutional ownership. The impact 
of corporate governance and institutional ownership differ between manufacturing and service 
industries. 
Results show that the decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality, board 
size, and internationalization of the firm, and a negative function of institutional ownership inthe 
American manufacturing industry. 
Findings also show that the decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality and 
board size, and a negative function of institutional ownership in the American service industry. 
Findings show that when firm size is held constant: 
(i) The decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality and board size, and a 
negative function of institutional ownership in America (entire sample). 
(ii) The decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality, board size, and 
internationalization of firm in the American manufacturing industry. 
(iii) The decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality and board size, and a 
negative function of institutional ownership in the American service industry. 
Results show that when firm performance is held constant: 
(i) The decision to pay dividends is a negative function of institutional ownership in 
America. 
(ii) The decision to pay the amount of dividends is a negative function of institutional 
ownership in the American manufacturing industry. 
(iii) The decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality and a negative 
function of institutional ownership in the American service industry. 
Findings also show that when financial leverage is held constant: 
(i) The decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality and board size, and 
a negative function of institutional ownership in America. 
(ii) The decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality and 
internationalization of the firm and a negative function of institutional ownership in the 
American manufacturing industry. 
(iii) The decision to pay dividends is a positive function of CEO duality, board size, and ii) a 
negative function of institutional ownership in the American service industry. 
The results also show that when firm growth is held constant: 
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(i) The decision to pay dividends is a negative function of institutional ownership in 
America. 
(ii) The decision to pay dividends is a negative function of institutional ownership in the 
American manufacturing industry. 
In conclusion, CEO duality and board size positively impact the decision to pay dividends and 
institutional ownership negatively impacts the decision to pay dividends. 
The findings of this study lend some support to the findings of Baker et al. (1985), Pruitt and 
Gitman (1991), Collins et al. (1996), Maury and Pajuste (2002), Amidu and Abor (2006), Anil and 
Kapoor (2008), Renneboog and Trojanowski (2008), Ali-Shah (2009), Gill, Biger, and Tibrewala 
(2010), John and Muthusamy (2010), Wen and Jia (2010), Bokpin (2011), Subramaniam and Susela 
(2011), Asif, Rasool, and Kamal (2011), and Chen, Lin, and Yong-Cheol (2011). Table 5 shows the 
summary of the findings of previous authors related to the impact of corporate governance and 
institutional ownership on dividend payout. 
 
Table 5: Previous Findings on the Impact of Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership on Dividend 
Payout 
 
Author Findings Country/Markets 
Baker et al. (1985)  Found that the anticipated level of future earnings is the determinant of dividend payment. USA 
Pruitt and Gitman 
(1991) 
 Found that current and past years' profits are important factors in influencing 
dividend payments. USA 
Collins et al. (1996)  Found a negative relationship between i) historical sales growth and dividend payout and ii) firm’s risk and the dividend payout. USA 
Baker and Powell 
(2000)  Found that dividend determinants are industry specific. USA 
Maury and Pajuste 
(2002) 
 Found that the separation of ownership and control through high-voting shares and 
pyramid control structures does not have a significant impact on dividend policy. 
The authors concluded that firm’s control structure affects i) the dividend payout 
policy and ii) dominant shareholders in control may collude in generating private 
benefits of control that are not shared with minority shareholders. Thus, high 
institutional ownership (i.e., high percentage shareholding by institutions such as 
mutual fund companies, pension funds, and/ or endowments) has negative impact 
on dividend payout decision. 
Finland 
Amidu and Abor 
(2006) 
 Found a positive relationship between corporate profitability and dividend payout 
ratios, and a negative relationship historical sales growth and dividend payout. Ghana 
Anil and Kapoor 
(2008) 
 Found that profitability has been considered as a primary indicator of dividend 
payout ratio. India 
Renneboog and 
Trojanowski (2008) 
 Found that profitability is a crucial determinant of payout decisions, but the 
presence of strong block holders or block holder coalitions weakens the 
relationship between the corporate earnings and the payout dynamics. Block 
holders appear to realize that an overly generous payout may render the company 
liquidity constrained, and consequently, result in suboptimal investment policy. 
UK 
Ali-Shah (2009)  Found positive relationships between i) institutional ownership and dividend payout and ii) CEO duality with dividend payout. Pakistan 
Gill, Biger, and 
Tibrewala (2010) 
 Found that the dividend payout is the function of profit margin, sales growth, and 
debt-to-equity ratio. USA 
John and 
Muthusamy (2010) 
 Found a negative relationship between i) firm growth and dividend payout, and ii) 
leverage and dividend payout.  India 
Wen and Jia (2010)  Found a negative relationship between institutional ownership and dividend payout. USA 
Bokpin (2011)  Found a positive relationship between board size and dividend payout, and a negative relationship between financial leverage and dividend payout. Ghana 
Subramaniam and 
Susela (2011)  Found that dividend payout is weaker for firms with a larger board size. Malaysia 
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Table 5: Previous Findings on the Impact of Corporate Governance and Institutional Ownership on Dividend 
Payout - continued 
 
Asif, Rasool, and 
Kamal (2011)  Found a negative relationship between financial leverage and divided payout. Pakistan 
Chen, Lin, and 
Yong-Cheol (2011) 
 Found a positive relationship between the size of the board of directors and the 
propensity of companies to pay cash dividends, and a negative relationship 
between CEO duality and the propensity to pay cash dividends. 
China 
 
4.7. Limitations 
The sample size of this study is small. This study is limited to American manufacturing and service 
firms. Therefore, the findings of this study could only be generalized to firms similar to those that were 
included in this research. 
 
4.8. Future Research 
Future research should include a large sample from different countries. Future study should include 
other variables such as board composition and CEO tenure. 
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